Concepts, Intension, and Identity in Tibetan Philosophy of Language by Stoltz, Jonathan
  
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 
Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008) pp. 383–400
CONCEPTS, INTENSION, AND IDENTITY IN TIBETAN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
JONATHAN STOLTZ 
Indian Buddhist philosophers’ task of accounting for the meaningful-
ness of language is perhaps most famously addressed in Dignāga’s 
doctrine of apoha, which claims that general terms do not possess 
meaning by referring to positively existing universals, but instead 
impart meaning through a negative process of exclusion. As Mark 
Siderits points out, this Buddhist theory of language “forced [Dignā-
ga and his followers] to say that there is more to linguistic meaning 
than just reference.”1 Siderits’ own contention is that, beyond refer-
ence, Buddhist philosophers were “forced to recognize sense – the 
mode of presentation of the reference of an expression – as a distinct 
element of meaning.”2 There is something importantly correct about 
Siderits’ remarks, but to the extent that Buddhist philosophical theo-
ries differ from school to school and time period to time period, 
more needs to be said about Buddhist theories of word meaning. 
In this article I will examine one highly localized set of develop-
ments to the Buddhist doctrine of word meaning that was made by 
twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists 
primarily schooled at gSa phu Monastery in central Tibet. I will 
show how these thinkers developed the notion of a concept (don 
spyi) in order to explain how it is that words are capable of applying 
to real objects, and how concepts can be used to capture elements of 
word meaning extending beyond reference to real objects. In particu-
lar, I will focus on the developments made by Phywa pa Chos kyi 
se ge in the middle of the twelfth century, as well as on reactions to 
those developments by Sa skya Paita in the first half of the thir-
 
 1 Siderits (1986), p. 343.  
 2 Ibid, p. 331. Italics mine. 
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teenth century. My investigation will begin by explaining how Ti-
betan Buddhist epistemologists make use of concepts in order to ac-
count for how it is that words are capable of applying to particular 
objects. I will then focus on one particular area where this appeal to 
concepts plays a central role in Tibetan accounts of word meaning – 
namely, with regard to the relation of sameness or identity (gcig pa). 
Finally, I will tie this discussion to the views of the Tibetan polymath 
Sa skya paita, showing how he reacts against earlier Tibetan 
theories of word reference. 
1. bKa’ gdams epistemologists on intentional objects and inten-
sional objects 
It is often asserted that Buddhist philosophers uphold the view that 
certain objects or experiences are ineffable, unable to be communi-
cated in language. While many claims are made by Indian and Ti-
betan Buddhists about the limitations of language, one particular 
claim that was important within the Buddhist epistemological tradi-
tion was the declaration by the tradition’s forefather, Dignāga, that 
verbalization can only occur in conceptual thought – thought that 
takes general entities, and not concrete particulars, as its object. 
Given this foundational assertion, how then can Buddhist 
epistemologists account for the referential nature of language? How 
is it that words can refer to objects in the external world?  
In order to see how bKa’ gdams Tibetan epistemologists were 
able to make sense of the referential capacity of language, it is 
important to locate these thinkers’ theories of language within their 
general accounts of conceptual thought, for it is out of a more gen-
eral account of cognitive objects that Tibetan thinkers construct their 
theories of language. Even though the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist 
epistemological traditions accept Dignāga’s root assertion that 
conceptual thought takes general entities (sāmānyalakaa) – which 
are unreal – as its objects, thinkers as early as Dharmakīrti sought 
also to explain how conceptual thought can be grounded in reality. A 
major step is taken by the eighth century philosopher Dharmottara, 
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who delineates two different aspects of the objects of cognition.3 
These items are refined by Tibetan thinkers at gSa phu Monastery 
in central Tibet in such a way as to expose both the phenomenal na-
ture of thought and the intentional nature of thought. According to 
rog Blo ldan śes rab and Phywa pa Chos kyi se ge, two major 11th 
and 12th century thinkers from gSa phu Monastery, conceptual 
thought bears on two distinct kinds of objects.4 The object that di-
rectly appears to a person’s mind in conceptual thought is a mentally 
constructed – i.e., non-objective – phenomenal object (gzu yul or 
sna yul). Phywa pa provides a name for these phenomenal objects 
of conceptual thought. He calls them “concepts” (don spyi). The Ti-
betan term don spyi – or at least its Sanskrit equivalent, arthasāmā-
nya – is present in the works of Dignāga, but this particular role as 
the phenomenal object of conceptual thought appears to begin with 
Phywa pa. While Phywa pa and his followers accept the existence of 
concepts, conceptual thought isn’t typically about concepts. Thought 
typically bears on, or is directed toward, external reality.5 The ob-
jects that conceptual thought is directed toward are called intentional 
objects (źen yul) – where these intentional objects are not mental 
constructions, but are, rather, (typically) objects or properties in the 
external world.  
This distinction between phenomenal objects and intentional ob-
jects is quite sensible. When I think about something like the Potala 
Palace, what directly appears to my mind is a concept, or maybe 
even an image, of it. Nevertheless, my thoughts are not about the 
concept of the Potala, my thoughts are about the Potala Palace itself. 
Similarly, in the Buddhist context, when a person in conceptual 
thought infers the existence of a fire on a hill from having perceived 
smoke, even though what directly appears to the person’s mind is the 
concept of a fiery hill, the inference is not about a concept. Rather, 
the inference is about a real fire on a real hill. As the thirteenth cen-
 
 3 Dharmottara, 179a4: śes pa rnams kyi yul ni rnam pa gñis te / gzu ba da źen pa’o /. 
 4 See Phywa pa (2006b), 1b–11a, and rog (2006), 8b–9a.  
 5 Conceptual thought needn’t necessarily be directed toward external reality. Thought 
can be about mental episodes (śes pa) or about concepts (don spyi).  
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tury Tibetan scholar Sa skya Paita (henceforth, Sa pa) sarcasti-
cally notes,6  
When someone says, “Pour water into pot!,” I [automatically] understand the 
object of application [i.e., the intentional object] to be a real particular, and 
don’t ask, “[Should I] pour the water into a real pot or [should I] pour the 
water into the concept of a pot?” 
This distinction between the phenomenal objects and intentional ob-
jects of conceptual thought is projected by early Tibetan epistemolo-
gists onto their theory of language. Phywa pa and his followers agree 
that when a person utters a word like “snake,” what the word directly 
signifies (dos kyi brjod bya) is the concept of a snake. Yet, these Ti-
betan thinkers also hold that, insofar as language is intentional and 
attempts to describe reality, the word “snake” has as its intentional 
signification (źen pa’i brjod bya) a real, objectively existing snake.7 
It is a phenomenal object – a concept – that is directly signified by 
words, but the words are not about the phenomenal object. Instead, 
words are directed toward, or denote, the real object that is the 
words’ intentional signification.8 
We can also, by drawing a comparison to Western philosophical 
theories of language, identify an important link between directly and 
intentionally signified entities. Georges Dreyfus understands the 
distinction to be comparable to Gottlob Frege’s famous distinction 
between sense and reference. 9  The concepts that are directly 
 
 6 Sa skya paita, p. 122: bum par chu blugs śig ces brjod pa na’a ra mtshan gyi 
bum par chu ldugs sam don spyi’i bum par ldugs źes mi ’dri bar ’jug yul don ra mtshan 
ñid go ba yin te.  
Admittedly, Sa skya paita puts forward this quote within the context of how language 
can be efficacious, and not exactly so as to distinguish phenomenal objects from inten-
tional objects. As such, he speaks of the object of application (’jug yul), which, in concep-
tual thought is equivalent to the intentional object (źen yul). 
 7 In Phywa pa’s Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and Tshad ma rnam es kyi ’grel pa there is 
no full discussion of this distinction, though the distinction is clearly presupposed when he 
uses the terms. My explanation comes primarily from Sa skya paita’s much fuller 
discussion of the terms. 
 8 Of course, all this is consistent with there being a failure of reference. Sometimes I 
can use a term, intending to signify a real object, and yet fail to do so. 
 9 Dreyfus (1997), pp. 261–74. Cf. Frege (1980). 
TIBETAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
 
387
signified by words are taken to be analogous to Frege’s senses, 
whereas the real particulars that are intentionally signified are said to 
be analogous to Frege’s referents. Now, for Frege, it isn’t simply that 
word meaning consists of two freestanding elements. Rather, he 
contends that it is a word’s sense that determines its referent. Each 
sense determines a unique referent. As such, identifying the referent 
of an expression is typically accomplished by grasping the expres-
sion’s sense. Much the same idea appears to hold true in the Bud-
dhist context as well. Words are capable of intentionally signifying 
real particulars by virtue of the relation that those particulars bear to 
the concepts that are directly signified by the words.10  
By thus distinguishing the intentional signification of words from 
the words’ direct signification, these Tibetan thinkers believe that 
they have successfully accounted for how language can apply to real-
ity – i.e., how particulars can be effable – while still holding true to 
Dignāga’s root assertion that verbalization can only occur in mental 
states that take universals (sāmānyalakaa) as their objects. In 
addition to particular objects in the external world, there are also 
mentally constructed concepts. It is these concepts that help link lan-
guage to objectively existing particulars. Having established this, we 
can now examine a more specific role that concepts play in Tibetan 
Buddhist theories of language, in the development of a philosophical 
account of identity. 
2. Identity and intensionality 
To the extent that both Tibetan Buddhist thinkers and Gottlob Frege 
held the belief that a fully adequate theory of language requires an 
appeal to some sort of intensional element – either a concept (Tib: 
don spyi) or sense (Ger: Sinn) – it is not surprising that we can find 
similarities in these thinkers’ views on identity. In fact, the stated 
goal of Frege’s essay “On Sense and Reference” is precisely to ex-
plain just what we mean when we assert identity statements. His pa-
per begins with the question of whether identity statements assert “a 
 
 10 See Siderits (1987) pp. 342–3 and Tillemans (1986) p. 215. 
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relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects.”11 
Similarly, in the Tibetan Buddhist context much ink has been spilled 
in trying to explain the complex nature of the identity relation, and 
just like in Frege’s case, Tibetans attempt to make sense of identity 
by appealing to something like a term’s sense or intension. One nota-
ble contrast, however, involves the relata of the identity statements 
themselves. Frege’s central concern is with proper names, whereas 
Buddhist thinkers are focused principally on identity statements con-
structed with general terms. The central question that I will be 
addressing in what follows is that of what conditions twelfth and 
thirteenth century Tibetan epistemologists, and Phywa pa Chos kyi 
se ge in particular, held to be necessary and sufficient for the truth 
of identity statements involving two general terms.  
Tibetan philosophers describe various types of identity relations – 
identical essence (o bo gcig), identical substance (rdzas gcig), 
identical extension (don gcig), and so forth. Many of these forms of 
identity have been carefully discussed in articles by Tom Tillemans 
(1983 and 1986), and will not be addressed here. My concern in this 
section of the essay is with the relation of identity simpliciter, and 
focuses on the simple question: when is an identity statement con-
structed with two general terms true? Operating under the presump-
tion that identity simpliciter (gcig) in the Tibetan Buddhist context is 
an identity between qualities or dharma (chos gcig), the question can 
be stated: when do two general terms express the same quality?  
A natural reply to this question by Indian Grammarians would be 
to claim that such identity statements are true if and only if the two 
general terms pick out the same universal. This option is not open to 
Buddhist philosophers, however, as they generally reject the exis-
tence of universals. Given this rejection, one might be tempted to 
conclude that what a general term expresses is the class of particular 
objects formed through a process of exclusion – excluding all those 
objects to which the general term does not apply. This is, after all, 
the heart of Dignāga’s apoha project. Were this interpretation cor-
rect, it would follow that statements of identity are true whenever the 
 
 11 Frege (1980), p. 56. 
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two general terms are coextensive. Indian and Tibetan Buddhist 
epistemologists overwhelmingly maintain, however, that two differ-
ent qualities can be coextensive, thus showing that a term’s exten-
sion alone is insufficient for determining a quality’s identity condi-
tions. That two different qualities can be coextensive is seen from 
the fact that there are non-trivial inferences involving coextensive 
qualities. When, for example, a person infers that sound is imperma-
nent because it is a product, the two qualities, impermanence and be-
ing produced, are extensionally equivalent. Yet, the fact that this 
inference is non-trivial implies that these two terms possess distinct 
meanings. Needless to say, it is apparent that the meaning of a gen-
eral term must indeed consist of more than the extension of that 
term. 
It is at this point where the developments made by the twelfth 
century Tibetan epistemologist Phywa pa Chos kyi se ge help to 
provide a novel explanation of what this element of meaning is over 
and above the term’s extension. As shown above, in addition to the 
particular objects falling within the exclusion classes of general 
terms, twelfth century Tibetan thinkers claim that for each term there 
is also a corresponding, mentally constructed concept (don spyi), and 
it is these concepts that provide us with something like intensional 
elements of meaning. Identity and difference of these intensional ele-
ments are captured with the relations of ‘identical connotation’ (ldog 
pa gcig) and ‘different connotation’ (ldog pa tha dad).12 Two quali-
ties satisfy the ‘identical connotation’ relation just in case the con-
cepts that arise in one’s mind when conceiving of the two qualities 
are identical.13 Expressed linguistically, this is to say that the concept 
 
 12 The translation of “ldog pa” as “connotation” is, quite obviously, far from literal. 
Nevertheless, it is meant as a good approximation of the role played by the term in this 
particular philosophical context. Translating “ldog pa” as “distinguisher” or “isolate,” as 
some have done, does produce a somewhat more literal translation, but does so by using 
words in English that have no standard philosophical meanings.  
 13 This equivalence is never directly stated by Phywa pa himself. There are several 
places where he expresses half of this equivalence, by stating that ldog pa tha dad entails 
don spyi so sor sna pa. For example, in Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel 6b3: ldog pa tha dad 
pas don spyi so sor sna par ‘gyur te. (This line appears within a hypothetical opponent’s 
argument, but Phywa pa never questions the veracity of the claim.) In dBu ma śar gsum 
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that dawns in a person’s mind when she cognitively entertains (and 
grasps the meaning of) the one term is the same as the concept that 
dawns when she grasps the other term.14 When this condition is not 
met, the two qualities stand in the ‘different connotation’ relation.  
The further question that needs to be addressed is how appeals to 
concepts and the ‘identical connotation’ relation can help solve the 
problem of when two general terms pick out the same quality. A 
natural thought at this point is that satisfaction of the ‘identical 
connotation’ relation might be sufficient for identity simpliciter. This 
would mean that if two terms give rise to the very same concept – 
that is, if they are intensionally/connotatively identical – then the two 
terms express the same quality. My own belief is that this is, in fact, 
the most philosophically tenable position to hold. While this view 
fits well with the commonly held belief that connotation determines 
denotation, it is not entirely obvious whether Tibetan philosophers 
actually accept this view, or whether they have an even more strin-
gent requirement for identity simpliciter.  
3. Ultra-intensionality 
Tom Tillemans (1986) claims that Tibetan philosophers – and here, 
he is referring principally to dGe lugs thinkers – uphold a thesis of 
ultra-intensionality for terms – each term has a different intension 
from every other distinct term. Tillemans derives this thesis by 
analyzing the conditions under which Tibetans assert the identity 
 
gyi sto thun 2a1: rdzas gcig ñid la ltos sa log sa tha dad las log pa la ltos pas don spyi so 
sor śar te sgro ‘dogs tha dad bsal nas es par bya ba bum pa’i byas pa da mi rtag pa ltar 
o bo gcig la ldog pas byas pa’i tha dad pa’am / śi da ljon pa ltar chos gcig ñid la rnam 
gras pa’i sgras tha dad lta bur brjod pa yin. In this longer quote, it is not only clear that 
ldog pa tha dad entails don spyi so sor sna ba – which means, when stated in the 
contrapositive, that sameness of concepts (don spyi gcig) entails sameness of connotation 
(ldog pa gcig), it is also reasonable to think that sameness of connotation entails sameness 
of concepts. 
 14 In some sense, these two phrasings of the ‘same connotation’ relation are not iden-
tical. The difference here arises in connection with the fact that there are terms – those like 
“son of a barren woman” and “horn of a rabbit” – that give rise to concepts but do not ex-
press qualities (dharma) at all.  
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relation. Tillemans’ claim is essentially that, for any two qualities  
and ,  
 (a)  is identical to  (  da gcig yin) 
if and only if 
 (b) “” is identical to “.” 
Simply put, two terms express the same quality if and only if the two 
terms are themselves identical. Thus, on this account it is true that  
 (e1) Cordate is identical to cordate 
but false that 
 (e2) Cordate is identical to renate. 
Despite the fact (assuming, rather obnoxiously, that it is a fact) that 
the general terms “cordate” (creature with a heart) and “renate” 
(creature with a kidney) have the same extensions, the fact that these 
two terms are not identical gives us grounds for concluding that 
“Cordate is identical to renate” is false.  
Expounding on this a bit more, it is important to note that there 
are two distinct readings possible for sentence form (b). On the first 
reading, we can take the expressions in quotes – “” and “” – to be 
instances of what Frege calls indirect reference, where the indirect 
referent of a term is taken to be the ordinary sense of that term. 
Replacing Frege’s term “sense” with Carnap’s term “intension,” on 
this first reading of (b) we get, 
 (b1) the intension of  is identical to the intension of  
On the second reading of (b), what this condition requires is that the 
general terms “” and “” be two tokens of the very same sign. That 
is, (b) is claimed not to be stating an identity of the intensions of  
and , rather, it is stating the identity of the signs “” and “” them-
selves. On this reading we get, 
 (b2) The sign “” is identical to the sign “.” 
There is no question that these two readings – (b1) and (b2) – are 
not logically equivalent. Condition (b2) entails (b1) but not vice 
versa, since two distinct terms can possess the same intension, as for 
example with the words “horse” and “steed.” We may suppose along 
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with Frege that the words “horse” and “steed” have not only the 
same extension but also the same intension. There may be aesthetic 
reasons for preferring the word “steed” over “horse” in certain con-
texts, but in point of meaning the two terms are identical. Neverthe-
less, the two signs “horse” and “steed” are obviously distinct.  
Since the two conditions, (b1) and (b2), are logically distinct, the 
question of which of the two conditions is actually the right one for 
Tibetans to adopt for identity simpliciter, (a), is a pressing concern. 
Should we hold, as I suggested earlier, that connotative sameness is 
sufficient for sameness simpliciter, or should we say that two terms 
pick out the same quality only if the two terms are themselves identi-
cal? 
Tillemans’ contention is essentially that Tibetan philosophers do 
not distinguish these two different interpretations of condition (b). 
He believes that Tibetan thinkers uphold the view that (b1) is, in fact, 
equivalent to (b2), for he takes them to adopt the view that two dis-
tinct terms cannot possess the same intension. This is precisely the 
thesis of ultra-intensionality: each term possesses a different inten-
sion from every other term. As Tillemans puts it, 
For a Fregean “bachelor” and “unmarried man” would express the same 
sense (intension). But for a Buddhist, they would have different sense be-
cause the names are different. Hence, I will speak of the Buddhist entities as 
being “ultra-intensional.”15 
Indeed, there is a large quantity of textual support corroborating 
Tillemans’ belief that Tibetan philosophers of the dGe lugs sect view 
language as ultra-intensional. Tillemans gives an extensive quote 
from the Collected Topics textbook of the nineteenth century writer 
Phur lcog pa,16 in which the author not only sets condition (b2) as a 
 
 15 Tillemans (1986), p. 213. 
 16 In the Tibetan exile community this author – Yos ʼdzin phur lcog pa blo bza tshul 
khrims byams pa rgya mtsho – is commonly called “Phur bu lcog.” This rendering of his 
name is derided as a linguistic corruption by scholars in Tibet itself where he is usually 
called “Phur lcog pa” or, sometimes, “Phur bu lcog pa.” In any case, this epithet is given 
to the author due to his having supposedly lived, from ages 5 to 10, in the Phur bu lcog 
mountain range just north of Se ra Monastery. 
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necessary condition for identity – viz., “because if [two items] are 
identical, then they must be identical in both name and referent”17 – 
but also contrasts this with cases in which two qualities (dharma, 
chos) are taken to be distinct precisely because a person can validly 
ascertain the one without ascertaining the other. But this ability to 
ascertain one quality without ascertaining a second quality that is 
coextensive with it is generally rooted in those two qualities having 
distinct concepts/connotations associated with them. In thus drawing 
the contrast between two elements  being identical in both name 
and referent and  having different connotations at least indirectly 
suggests that Phur lcog pa took conditions (b1) and (b2) to be equiva-
lent. 
This view was certainly not universally accepted by twelfth and 
thirteenth century Tibetan philosophers, however. There are several 
cases of twelfth century Tibetan philosophers unmistakably dis-
tinguishing condition (b1) from (b2). In two different texts18 Phywa 
pa Chos kyi Se ge briefly describes a number of different forms of 
identity and difference. In each case, he claims that it is possible to 
have two distinct terms that pick out the very same quality/dharma 
(chos gcig ñid la rnam gras pa’i sgras tha dad). Moreover, it is 
apparent from the context in which these claims are made that he 
takes these two terms to have exactly the same intensions.19 That is, 
the very same concept dawns in one’s mind when thinking about 
each of the two terms. Phywa pa’s example of two distinct words 
having the same intension are “śi” and “ljon pa” – both of which 
carry the same meaning as the English word “tree.” One of Phywa 
pa’s successors, the author of The Summary of the Quintessence of 
Epistemology (Tshad ma’i de kho na ñid bsdus pa), makes a similar 
claim.20 He states that there are cases in which two distinct terms 
 
 17 Yongs ’dzin (2000), p. 31. 
 18 For the quote from the dBu ma śar gsum gyi sto thun see footnote 13. Tshad ma yid 
kyi mun sel 11b8: śi da ljon pa ltar ldog pa cig ñid la rnam gras kyi sgras brjod pa.  
 19 These cases are contrasted with cases in which the terms have distinct connotations 
(ldog pa tha dad) and distinct concepts arising. 
 20  Klong chen rab ’byams, p. 51: ldog pa da dos po gñis ka tha dad med pa zan da 
bśos lta bu. This text is credited to the fourteenth century scholar Long chen pa. However, 
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have the same connotation (ldog pa) and refer to the same material 
thing(s) (dos po). As an example, he offers the terms “zan” and 
“bśos,” both of which carry the meaning of the English word “food.”  
These illustrations of a theory of word meaning in which distinct 
linguistic signs possess the same connotation or intension go a long 
way toward helping us to understand some key issues in early Ti-
betan philosophy of language. First, we can see that, pace Tillemans, 
not all Tibetan philosophers accept the thesis of ultra-intensionality. 
It would have been a remarkable historical fact about Tibetan 
philosophical thought had they never recognized the possibility of 
two distinct terms possessing the same meaning. Nevertheless, 
Phywa pa’s recognition of this possibility appears to have largely 
fallen on deaf ears with his Tibetan successors. While a close 
examination of the philosophical writings of other twelfth and thir-
teenth century Tibetan thinkers may yet yield many more examples 
of a rejection of ultra-intensional word meaning, Tillemans is quite 
right that in the more recent philosophical texts of the Tibetan 
epistemological tradition many of the most famous authors do adopt 
this thesis of ultra-intensionality.21 Another moral we can draw from 
this discussion is the fact that, in Phywa pa’s opinion, the actual 
requirement that must be met in order for two terms to pick out the 
same quality (simpliciter) is that the two terms be intensionally 
identical. The two terms need not themselves be identical. In this 
 
as van der Kuijp (2003) has documented, this attribution is highly dubious. Many 
contextual clues suggest that this work was composed shortly after Phywa pa’s famous 
Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel. 
 21 One contemporary writer, however, is very explicit in his rejection of the ultra-
intensionality thesis. In a book (derived from his MA thesis) written by a young Tibetan 
scholar named ’Bum skyabs a very provocative account of concepts (don spyi) is put for-
ward. The author straightforwardly proclaims that multiple terms can give rise to the same 
concept. His example is of the five terms “gtan tshigs,” “rtags,” “rgyu mtshan,” “phyogs 
kyi chos,” and “de sgrub kyi bsgrub pa’i chos,” all of which carry the meaning of the Eng-
lish terms “evidence” or “reason.” Explicitly, he claims, (’Bum skyabs, p. 43): don spyi 
gcig la mi du ma ʼjug pa yod de / rtags rigs kyi skabs su gtan tshigs da / rtags / rgyu 
mtshan / phyogs kyi chos / de sgrub kyi bsgrub pa’i chos rnams la don spyi gcig las med 
kya mi la yod pa lta bu’o //. 
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way, Phywa pa adopts the view that (b1) is the correct requirement 
for identity simpliciter, not (b2).  
Finally, this discussion provides us with clear examples of early 
Tibetan philosophers making use of concepts in order to capture ele-
ments of word meaning extending beyond extensionality. Not only 
can two different terms express the same quality – by virtue of those 
two terms giving rise to the same concept – two different qualities 
can be distinguished from each other by way of these associated con-
cepts. Thus, even when two terms are coextensive – such that any 
object instantiating the one term also instantiates the other term, and 
vice versa – the qualities they express can be distinguished in a per-
son’s mind through the different concepts to which they give rise. 
4. Sa skya Paita on concepts and reference 
Stepping back from the specific case of identity and returning to the 
central theme, what all of this serves to show is that by employing 
the notion of a concept (don spyi) bKa’ gdams epistemologists were 
able to explicate certain elements of cognition and language use in a 
clear and interesting manner. In what follows I will raise one diffi-
culty with this bKa’ gdams Tibetan account as it plays out in the 
writing of the thirteenth century polymath Sa pa. The claim by 
bKa’ gdams Tibetans that word meaning consists of both direct 
signification and intentional signification makes it possible to ex-
plain how Buddhist philosophers can connect language to external 
reality without falling into the Indian Grammarians’ trap of granting 
that words directly express particulars or universals. Sa pa cannot 
accept the details of the bKa’ gdams account, however, for he rejects 
the existence of concepts (don spyi).22 Insofar as this is the case, Sa 
pa cannot accept that concepts are the entities directly signified by 
language. In fact, Sa pa explicitly denies that there is anything at all 
that words directly signify. He states, “Ultimately, what is called 
‘signified’ (brjod bya) is not established at all.”23 This would not be a 
 
 22 For more on this, see my article, Stoltz (2006). 
 23 Sa skya paita, p. 121: don dam par na brjod bya źes bya ba grub pa ci’a med de /. 
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big deal, except that, as was pointed out above, words are capable of 
successfully applying to real things only indirectly. On the bKa’ 
gdams account, language directly signifies concepts, and these con-
cepts in turn make it possible for language to apply indirectly to real 
particulars. Once one eliminates concepts from this theory of lan-
guage, as Sa pa desires to do, it is difficult to see how words could 
still be capable of intentionally signifying real things. 
What we have here is an apparent conflict between Sa pa’s pre-
ferred accounts in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of lan-
guage. When presenting his theory of mind and mental content at the 
beginning of his Tshad ma rigs gter (Epistemology: Treasure of 
Reasoning), Sa pa goes through pains to argue that concepts (don 
spyi) do not exist. Yet, when he presents his own positive theory of 
language later in the same text, Sa pa wishes to make use of the 
bKa’ gdams distinction between direct signification and intentional 
signification, even though the former requires an appeal to a cate-
gory of entities whose existence he rejects. The challenge that Sa pa 
faces is that of explaining how language is capable of intentionally 
signifying particular objects given that concepts do not exist – that 
is, given that there is nothing at all that language directly signifies. 
Sa pa’s preferred method for dealing with this challenge is to 
look back to the Indian Buddhist tradition. Whereas Phywa pa Chos 
kyi se ge’s mode of operation is to account for the meaningfulness 
of language by inventing a new role for concepts (don spyi), Sa pa 
rejects this bKa’ gdams pa creativity and instead seeks to provide an 
explanation of word meaning that is modeled after that given by the 
Indian Buddhist masters. That said, the actual explanation given by 
Sa pa blends elements of the traditional Indian view together with 
elements of the bKa’ gdams pa account. On the one hand, he repeat-
edly acknowledges that there are, in fact, no objects directly signi-
fied by language (since the entities directly signified by language 
would be concepts, whose existence he rejects). Yet, at the same 
time, when he attempts to explain how it is that language can be di-
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rected toward real things and how words can be used efficaciously, 
he repeatedly appeals to concepts. Sa pa states,24 
Insofar as conceptual thought is essentially mistaken, 
An image, which is the object [indicated by] words (sgra yi don), dawns. 
Through that one longs for an external object, 
And that is posited as what the words signify. 
The view presented here is quite similar to his predecessors’. Two 
different sorts of entities are at work. There is both a mentally con-
structed image (or ‘reflection’) dawning in one’s mind and a real 
external object. As becomes clearer in subsequent passages, how-
ever, the image dawning in one’s mind is none other than a concept 
(don spyi).25 For Sa pa, this concept is required in order for lan-
guage to be applicable to reality, for he contends that it is only by 
virtue of conceptual thought mistakenly conflating concepts with 
real objects that language can be directed toward real particulars. 
This exposes even more clearly the conundrum that Sa pa faces. He 
wants to hold that concepts do not exist, and yet at the same time he 
wants to hold that language is capable of applying to reality only be-
cause of a mistaken conflation of concepts with external objects. But 
how can concepts be conflated with real particulars if concepts don’t 
even exist? It seems that Sa pa can’t have it both ways. I will con-
clude by offering one possible explanation for how Sa pa’s theory 
of language can be rendered sensible, and how this explanation 
shows quite clearly that Sa pa rejects the notion that external reality 
is ineffable. 
The explanation that I think Sa pa would offer in reply to the 
above problem is one involving a nuanced understanding of the 
ontological status of concepts. I’ve mentioned above that Sa pa 
spends the first several pages of his Tshad ma rigs gter arguing 
against the existence of concepts. This is true, but it also glosses over 
important details about the very notion of existence. For Sa pa, to 
 
 24 Ibid, p. 121–2: rtog pa o bos ʼkhrul pa la // sgra yi don gyi gzugs brñan śar // de la 
phyi rol don du źen // de ni sgra yi brjod byar btags //. 
 25 Ibid, p. 126: ’jig rten pa rnams don spyi la ra mtshan du ʼkhrul nas ra mtshan ñid 
bla ba da dor ba la ’jug pas na tha sñad rgyun ga la chad / 
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say that something is existent (yod pa) is equivalent to saying that it 
is an object of epistemic evaluation (gźal bya). Thus, what he is 
specifically denying is that concepts could be objects of epistemic 
judgment. This does not preclude the possibility that concepts “exist” 
in a more minimal way. Concepts might “exist” as mere fleeting im-
ages in one’s mind; images incapable of being evaluated in judg-
ment. By granting such a minimal status to concepts it would then be 
possible for these entities to be mistaken for real objects in the exter-
nal world, thus making Sa pa’s theory of language comprehensible. 
Ultimately, what this amounts to is an account of the efficacy of lan-
guage that on the one hand calls upon concepts in order to explain 
how the mind works so as to provide semantic content to language, 
but on the other hand does not postulate the genuine existence of 
concepts.  
Why is it, though, that Sa pa argues against the existence of con-
cepts? It is in answering this question that our investigation comes 
full circle. Sa pa offers two arguments against the existence of con-
cepts, with his second argument much more detailed and sophisti-
cated than the first. This second argument focuses in on the absurd 
consequences that he believes would follow were one to accept the 
existence of concepts. At the heart of his argument is the contention 
that inasmuch as concepts are mind dependent entities, they are, 
therefore, private objects, incapable of being communicated to oth-
ers. Sa pa states, “If they are dependent solely on an individual’s 
mind, although one could, through introspection, express [concepts] 
to another person, they would not understand.”26 Language could not 
be used to communicate the existence of these private concepts to 
others. In short, Sa pa’s argument is essentially that concepts do not 
exist because if they did they’d be ineffable. What this means is that, 
on Sa pa’s account, far from it being the case that language is 
incapable of referring to real particulars, just the opposite is the case. 
Words can be used to reference real things, but cannot be used to 
reference mentally constructed items such as concepts. 
 
 26 Ibid, p. 42: ra ra gi blo kho na da ’brel na ra rig pa bźin du gźan la bstan kya 
go bar mi ʼgyur ro // 
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